










THE GROWTH EFFECT OF DEMOCRACY: 







CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 2016 









An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 




THE GROWTH EFFECT OF DEMOCRACY: 






We estimate the effect of political regime transitions on growth with semi-parametric 
methods, combining difference in differences with matching, that have not been used in 
macroeconomic settings. Our semi-parametric estimates suggest that previous parametric 
estimates may have seriously underestimated the growth effects of democracy. In particular, 
we find an average negative effect on growth of leaving democracy on the order of −2 
percentage points implying effects on income per capita as large as 45 percent over the 1960-
2000 panel. Heterogenous characteristics of reforming and non-reforming countries appear to 
play an important role in driving these results. 
JEL Code: E2, O4, P. 













Institute of Political Economy, IGIER 
Bocconi University 





   
 
 
Second draft: May 14, 2007 
We thank participants in a seminar at CIFAR, and especially Dan Trefler, for helpful 
comments. Financial support from the Swedish Research Council, the Tore Browaldh 
Foundation, Bocconi University, and CIFAR is gratefully acknowledged. 1 Introduction
Political regimes can change suddenly, because of coups, popular revolts, or
the death of leaders. Such changes provide an opportunity to assess whether
economic policies or performance are inﬂuenced by political institutions. A
number of recent papers have exploited this opportunity. Using more or
less the same diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence methodology, they have all estimated
the average eﬀects of democratic transitions on economic growth, or some
other measures of economic performance, using a post-war panel data set
(see e.g., Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005), Papaioannou and Siourounis (2004),
Persson (2005), Persson and Tabellini (2006), Rodrik and Wacziarg (2004)).
While the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence strategy yields interesting results, which
are considerably more credible than those from a standard cross-sectional
regression, it still rests on strong identifying assumptions.1
The goal of this paper is to reassess the relation between democracy and
growth, while relaxing some of these strong identifying assumptions. To reach
this goal, we re-estimate the average eﬀect of political transitions on economic
growth by means of semi-parametric methods. Broadly speaking , we com-
bine aspects of diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence methods with aspects of propensity-
score methods, by giving more weight to the comparisons of reforming and
non-reforming countries that have similar probabilities of experiencing demo-
cratic reform. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst estimate the probability of regime change
conditional on a number of observable variables. We then use this estimated
probability, the propensity score, to evaluate the diﬀerence in growth per-
formance between the countries with and without a regime change. Under
the standard assumptions in the propensity-score literature (the selection-
on-observables and common-support assumptions), this empirical strategy
yields consistent estimates of the average eﬀect of political regime changes,
in cases when a standard diﬀerence in diﬀerence strategy would not. A theo-
retical paper by Abadie (2005) further discusses this approach to estimation.2
1It is hard to ﬁnd good instruments for regime changes. Jones and Olken (2005, 2006)
imaginatively use unexpected deaths of leaders, and the contrast between successful and
unsuccessful assassination attempts on leaders, respectively. The latter approach allows
them to estimate the likelihood of a democratic transition, but it is likely to generate
too weak an instrument (too few successful assassinations and too imprecise timing) for
democracy.
2Athey and Imbens (2006) generalize the diﬀerence in diﬀerence methodology along
related but diﬀerent lines. Their non-parametric approach also allows for hetereogeneous
treatment eﬀects, but relies on estimating the entire distribution of counterfactual out-
2Heckman et al. (1997) evaluate similar non-experimental estimators, using
data from a large-scale US social experiment with job training. Blundell
et al. (2004) apply a combination of matching and diﬀerence in diﬀerences
when estimating the eﬀect of UK job training programs. To our knowledge,
the present paper is the ﬁrst to apply matching cum diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
methods in a macroeconomic context.3 The macro setting raises speciﬁc is-
sues that are not present is standard microeconomic applications, such as a
relatively small sample and diﬀerent treatment (reform) dates for diﬀerent
observations.
Our empirical ﬁndings suggest that empirically relevant heterogeneities
are indeed present across countries, meaning that the ﬂexibility allowed by
semi-paramatric methods is important. We show that transitions from au-
tocracy to democracy are associated with an average growth acceleration of
about 1 percentage point, producing a gain in per capita income of about
13 percent by the end of the sample period. This 1 percent growth eﬀect is
imprecisely estimated, but larger than most of the estimates in the literature
using straight diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence methods (see the references mentioned
above). The eﬀect of transitions in the opposite direction is even larger: a
relapse from democracy to autocracy slows down growth by almost 2 per-
centage points on average, which implies an income fall of about 45 percent
at the end of the sample. These eﬀects are much larger than those commonly
found in the literature.
The paper proceeds to discuss the main econometric issues (Section 2),
describe the data (Section 3), and provide a benchmark with the straight
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach (Section 4). We then discuss some prelimi-
naries in the matching procedure (Section 5), present the paper’s main results
on how democracy aﬀects growth (Section 6), and conclude (Section 7).
2 Econometric Methods
This section introduces a number of econometric issues and methods to deal
with them. Most of it can probably be skimmed through by econometrically
proﬁcient readers who are familiar with the methods used in the treatment
comes for the treatment group in the absence of treatment.
3Persson and Tabellini (2003) apply propensity-score methods to evaluate the eﬀect of
alternative constitutional features, but they compare a cross section of countries and do
not exploit temporal variation in the data
3literature.
Our goal is to estimate the average causal eﬀect of becoming a democracy
on economic growth. To simplify the argument, we assume throughout the
section that we have access to a sample consisting of data from only two
types of countries: “treated” countries that experience a single transition from
autocracy into democracy, and “control” countries that remain autocracies
throughout the sample period.4 For each country in this sample, we observe
economic growth in country i and year t, yi,t, a dummy variable equal to one
under democracy, Di,t, and a vector of covariates, xi,t.
2.1 Diﬀerence in diﬀerence estimates
Several recent papers (see the Introduction) have estimated the average eﬀect
of democracy on growth from a panel regression like:
yi,t = φDi,t + ρxi,t + αi + θt + εi,t , (1)
where αi and θt are country and year ﬁxed eﬀects. This speciﬁcation seeks to
estimate the parameter φ by diﬀerence in diﬀerences, by comparing average
economic growth after the democratic transition minus growth before the
transition in the treated countries to the change in economic growth in the
control countries over the same period.
This estimation method allows for any correlation between the democracy
dummy Di,t and time-invariant country features — e.g., that fast-growing
countries are more likely to become democratic than slow-growing ones —
since the growth eﬀects of these country features are all captured by the
country ﬁxed eﬀect, αi. Nevertheless, identiﬁcation rests on an important
assumption: the selection of countries into democracy have to be uncorrelated
with the country-speciﬁc and time-varying shock to growth, εi,t.
This in turn corresponds to two restrictive assumptions. First, absent
any regime change, average growth in treated countries should (counterfac-
tually) have been the same as in control countries (conditional on xi,t). This
would fail, e.g., if democratic transitions are enacted by far-sighted leaders,
who have a lasting impact on growth irrespective of the regime change, or if
4For the time being, we thus neglect transitions from democracy to autocracy, and
exclude from the sample countries that always remained democracies. We also neglect
multiple transitions, and only consider countries that had a single transition from autoc-
racy into democracy. These complications are all dealt with in later sections.
4political transitions coincide with other events — such as the economic tran-
sitions towards free markets in former socialist countries — that may have a
lasting impact on economic growth.
To make this assumption more credible, the existing literature typically
attempts to increase the similarity between treated and controls by including
in the vector xi,t several covariates, such as initial per capita income, indica-
tors for war years or socialist transitions, indicator variables for continental
location (Africa, Asia and Latin America) interacted with year dummy vari-
ables, and so on.
The second restrictive assumption is that heterogeneity in the eﬀects of
democracy should not be systematically related to the occurrence of democ-
racy itself. Circumstances of regime changes diﬀer widely across time and
space, as do the types of political institutions adopted or abandoned. Thus,
the eﬀects of a crude democracy indicator are likely to diﬀer across obser-
vations. If we neglect this heterogeneity and estimate the average eﬀect of
democracy as in (1), the unexplained component of growth, εi,t, also includes
the term (φi,t − φ)Di,t, where φi,t is the country-speciﬁc eﬀect of democracy
in country i and year t. Identiﬁcation of φ now requires heterogeneity in the
eﬀect of reforms to be uncorrelated with their occurrence. This assumption
fails, e.g., if countries self-select into democracy based on the growth eﬀect
of regime changes (e.g., Di,t = 1 more likely when φi,t > φ).
To cope with this assumption, the dummy variable for democratic tran-
sitions is sometimes interacted with other observable features of democratic
transitions (such as the nature of democratic institutions that are acquired,
or the sequence of economic and political reforms). But this strategy quickly
runs into the curse of dimensionality problem. The possible interactions and
covariates are simply too many, relative to the limited number of democratic
transitions.
2.2 Matching estimates based on the propensity score
To circumvent the curse of dimensionality, the recent microeconometric lit-
erature has often come to rely on semi-parametric methods based on the
propensity score. Typically these applications concern a cross section of in-
dividuals. But a few recent papers have combined diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
estimates with matching based on the propensity score, exploiting repeated
observations for the same individuals. Abadie (2005) discusses an estimation
strategy that uses the propensity score to carry out estimates in the spirit
5of diﬀerence in diﬀerences, while Heckman et al. (1997) and Blundell et al.
(2004) provide theory as well as microeconometric applications.
The general idea is very intuitive. Performance — growth, in our case —
before and after the treatment date is observed for the treated group and
the control group. Conventional diﬀerence in diﬀerences compare the av-
erage change in performance for all the treated with the average change in
performance for all the controls, on the two sides of a common treatment
date. The matching approach instead compares each treated individual with
a set of “similar” controls, and a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimate is com-
puted with reference only to the matched controls. This way, controls simi-
lar to the treated are given large weight, and controls very dissimilar to any
treated observation may even be deemed entirely non-comparable, i.e., they
are left unmatched and given zero weight. Similarity is measured by the one-
dimensional metric of the propensity score, i.e., the probability of receiving
treatment conditional on a set of covariates. Basically, the eﬀect of treatment
is estimated by comparing groups of individuals with similar distributions of
those covariates that enter the estimation of the propensity score.
The microeconometric papers mentioned above discuss the econometric
theory behind this methodology, and we refer the reader to these papers for
more details. In this section, we conﬁne ourselves to stating and explaining
the main identifying assumptions. For this purpose, we need some notation
adapted from Persson and Tabellini (2003) and Abadie (2005).
2.2.1 The parameter of interest
As above, let D be an indicator for democracy (D = 1) or autocracy (D = 0).
Time is indexed by k, which corresponds to (an average over) years before
(k = 0) and after (k = 1) the year of democratic transition. Let Y D
i,k denote
potential growth of country i in period k and democratic state D (we use the
symbol Y, in distinction from y in the previous subsection, since growth in
period k is now an average of yearly growth rates during k). The individual
treatment eﬀect of democracy in country i and period k is then Y 1
i,k − Y 0
i,k,
the eﬀect on growth in period 1 if this country switched from autocracy to
democracy.
Consider a subset of the treated countries (i.e., countries with Di,1 =
1) with similar (time-invariant) characteristics, Xi. The expected eﬀect of
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6where the expectations operator E refers to unobserved determinants of
growth in democracy. Our parameter of interest is the average eﬀect of
treatment on the treated, namely :






i,1| Xi, Di,1 = 1)
￿
, (2)
where the outer expectations operator E is taken over X in the part of
the sample treated with democracy. This parameter measures the eﬀect
of democracy on growth in the countries that actually experienced the tran-
sition, relative to what would have happened had they remained autocracies.
In other words, the relevant counterfactual is remaining under autocracy.
Without additional assumptions, the parameter α does not say anything
about what growth would have been if the countries that remained autoc-
racies had instead become democracy (this would be a statement about the
eﬀect of treatment on the non-treated).
The fundamental problem of causal inference is that potential growth in
the counterfactual regime is not observed. We only observe actual growth in
one of the two possible political regimes. In particular, in period 1 we only
observe Y 1
i,1 in the countries that actually became democratic (the treated)
and Y 0
i,1 in the countries that actually had no transition (the controls). But
the term Y 0
i,1 (counterfactual growth in a democracy if it had remained an
autocracy) on the right-hand side of (2) is not observed.
2.2.2 Selection on observables
To come up with an observable counterpart to Y 0
i,1, we can make the key









i,0| Xi, Di,1 = 0) . (3)
The right- hand side of (3) is the (observed) average change in growth be-
tween periods 1 and 0 in countries that remained autocracies throughout
(the control group). The left-hand side is the (unobserved) average change
in growth that the countries which actually became democracies (the treated
group) would have experienced had they remained autocratic. Thus, the
critical assumption is that, conditional on X, without their democratic tran-
sition the treated countries would have followed a growth path parallel to that
of the control countries. This is the analog of the selection on observables
7assumption in a simple cross-sectional context5.
Decomposing the expectations operators on both sides of (3), all the
terms are observable except for one: E(Y 0
i,1| Xi,, Di,1 = 1). Thus, assump-
tion (3) enables us to obtain an observable counterpart of this unobserved
counterfactual, that can be used to estimate the parameter of interest in (2).
Intuitively, by conditioning on a large enough set of covariates X, we can
replace unobserved period 1 growth under autocracy in the treated countries
(the term E(Y 0
i,1| Xi,, Di,1 = 1)) with observed growth under autocracy over
the same period (the term E(Y 0
i,1| Xi, Di,1 = 0)) in those control countries
that have similar covariates Xi.
Importantly, this argument does not impose any functional-form assump-
tion on how democracy impacts on growth. Because the relevant conditional
expectations in (3) can all be computed non-parametrically, we can esti-
mate our the parameter of interest, α, non-parametrically just by comparing
(weighted) mean outcomes. This is the central diﬀerence between matching
and linear regression. Matching allows us to draw inferences from local com-
parisons only: as we compare countries with similar values of X, we do not
rely on counterfactuals very diﬀerent from the observed factuals. However,
this desirable property requires that any unobserved heterogeneity in the re-
sponse of growth to democracy be non-systematic across the two groups of
countries.
2.2.3 Propensity score and common support
In practice, however, the dimension of X is too large for direct matching
to be viable. This is where the propensity score methodology is helpful. An
important result due to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) implies that comparing
countries with the same probability of democratic transition (treatment) given
the controls X, is equivalent to comparing countries with similar values of
X.
Speciﬁcally, let
pi = p(Xi) = Prob [Di,1 = 1|Xi]
be the conditional probability that country i has a democratic transition
during our sample period, given the vector of controls, Xi. This conditional
5As Abadie (2005) notes, equation (3) coincides with the so called selection on observ-
ables assumption used in cross sectional studies if in addition we also have E(Y 0
i0 | Xi,
Di1 = 1) = E(Y 0
i1 | Xi, Di1 = 0).
8probability is also called the propensity score. Assume that the propensity
score is bounded away from 0 and 1 for all countries, an assumption known
as the so-called common-support condition:
0 < p(Xi) < 1, all Xi . (4)
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that, in a cross sectional setting, condi-
tioning on the vector X is equivalent to conditioning on the scalar p. If (4)









i,0| p(Xi), Di,1 = 0) , (5)
For countries with similar propensity scores, realized transitions to democ-
racy are random and uncorrelated with growth. We can thus replace the
unobserved counterfactual on the left-hand side of (5) with the observed
factual on the right-hand side of (5).
2.2.4 What do we gain?
The main advantage of this semi-parametric (semi-parametric because we
have to estimate the propensity score) approach over the parametric diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerence approach is that it relaxes linearity. We can thus allow for any
heterogeneity in the eﬀect of democracy, as long as it is related to the ob-
servable covariates X. Suppose e.g., that richer countries are more likely to
become democracies, and that democracy also works better in richer coun-
tries. Then the linear estimates corresponding to equation (1) would be
biased unless we also included an interaction term between income and the
democracy dummy. This bias is removed if income is included among the
covariates X used to estimate the propensity score. Of course, unobserved
heterogeneity remains a problem. Any omitted variable uncorrelated with X
that inﬂuences both the adoption and the eﬀects of democracy would violate
selection on observables. But since — as a practical matter — economic, so-
cial and cultural characteristics tend to cluster a great deal across countries,
unobserved diﬀerences among countries may well correlate with observed dif-
ferences.
A second advantage of this approach is that it allows a simple diagnostic
to check that the distribution of observed covariates is balanced between the
countries in the treated group and the control group. If the distribution of
a speciﬁc covariate is very unbalanced in the two samples of countries, it is
9important to check if the results are robust to including this variable when
estimating the propensity score. Intuitively, if the treated and controls have
similar covariates the linearity assumption entailed in conventional diﬀerence
in diﬀerence is just a convenient local approximation. If they do not, the
dissimilarity may bias the results.
Of course, there is no free lunch. The main cost of a semi-parametric
approach is that the estimates are less eﬃcient than parametric estimates
(under the null of the assumed functional form). Given the small samples in
macroeconomics relative to standard micro applications, the loss in precision
is non-neglible.
2.2.5 Implementation in practice
Our actual sample — unlike the stylized example and typical microeconomic
applications like training programs — has diﬀerent transition dates Ti, for dif-
ferent observations i = 1,...,I. Of course, our estimation procedure will have
to cope with this additional complication. Also diﬀerent from the example
in this section, the actual sample includes transitions from democracy to au-
tocracy. This presents no conceptual problems (see further below), however,
so we can continue to think about treatment as a transition into democracy.
In practice, we implement the estimation in ﬁve steps.
(i) We begin by deﬁning a group of treated and a group of control coun-
tries and estimate the probability of treatment. This is done in a cross section
by means of a logit regression, where the dependent variable equals one for
all countries making a transition at some time within the sample and zero
for those that don’t, and where all the covariates are time invariant. The
estimated probability of a transition to democracy is our measure of the
propensity score.
(ii) Next, for each country treated with democracy, we compute average
growth before and after the date of transition, Ti. The diﬀerence between














where yi,t is the yearly growth in period t and Nb
i and Na
i are the number
of years before and after and the transition date in country i. (The next
section describes how we deal with multiple transitions, so for now think
10about the procedure as applying to a set up where each country has at most
one transition in the sample period.)
(iii) Subsequently, we match each treated country with some of the con-
trols. For each of these controls, we compute the diﬀerence in average growth
over the periods before and after the transition date in the treated country
they are matched with: the expression is thus identical to (6), except that
yi,t is replaced with yj,t. We denote the resulting variable as g
j
i where the j
superscript refers to a certain country j among the controls and i refers to
the treated country. In doing this, we make sure that the years over which
gi and g
j
i are computed exactly coincide.
(iv) For each treated country, we then compute the weighted average of
the non-parametric diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator ˆ αi:






where wi,j ≥ 0,
￿
j wi,j = 1, are weights based on the propensity score.
These weights diﬀer depending on the detailed properties of the matching
estimators and some controls may receive zero weight if they are very diﬀerent
from the treated country with which they are matched. The parameter ˆ αi
is our estimate of the eﬀect of democratic transition on growth in country i.
Intuitively, it measures how growth in country i changed after the transition,
relative to a weighted average of the (similar) controls it is matched with.
(v) Finally, we compute the average estimated eﬀect of transitions to
democracy in the group of treated countries, ˆ α, as a simple average of the







where I denotes the number of treated countries in our sample. This is our
estimator of the average eﬀect of democracy on growth (the average eﬀect of
treatment on the treated).
Clearly, this procedure may use each control country several times, as the
same controls may be matched with several treated countries and possibly
at diﬀerent dates. This matters for the computation of the standard error





i.e., between growth in control country j when it is used as a control for
treated countries i and k. Of course, the correlation will be positive and





k might even be negative if the transition dates are far part.
The appendix provides analytic expressions for the standard error of α under









k are perfectly correlated. While (b) certainly yields
an upper bound, the true standard errors might be lower than under (a) if




k is prevalent. When computing the
standard errors, we assume that all treated countries have the same variance,
as do all control countries. We also neglect that the weights are estimated in
a ﬁrst step (i.e., we treat the propensity score as known). Both assumptions
are standard in the applied literature (see, e.g., Lechner, 2000).6
3 Data and Sample Deﬁnitions
Our panel data set includes annual data on economic growth and political
regimes for as many countries as possible over the years 1960-2000. Economic
growth is measured as the yearly growth rate of per-capita income, and the
source is the Penn World Tables. We classify a country as democratic if the
polity2 variable in the Polity IV data set is strictly positive. The threshold
of 0 for polity2 corresponds to a generous deﬁnition of democracy, but has
the advantage that many large changes in the polity2 are clustered around
0. This is important, since we want to identify the causal eﬀect of regime
transitions on growth exploiting the time variation in the data. A deﬁnition
of democracy based on a higher threshold for polity2 would classify as demo-
cratic transitions also very gradual changes in the underlying indicators of
polity2, that are unlikely to be associated with signiﬁcant changes in political
regimes.7
We also include some other covariates, that will be introduced and de-
ﬁned in context. The resulting panel is unbalanced, partly because of data
availability and partly because countries do not enter the data set until their
year of independence.
6An alternative — to be pursued in future work — would be to compute the standard
errors by bootstrapping. Doing so would take into account that the weights wi,j are
uncertain, since they are based on (logit) estimates of the propensity score.
7An alternative would be to use a classiﬁcation of political regimes, based on a ﬁner
subdivision of the 21-step scale for the polity 2 score. This would turn the analysis into
the domain oﬀ multiple tretments (see e.g., Lechner, 2001)
12From this panel data set we construct two partly overlapping samples,
which are used to study transitions to democracy and autocracy, respec-
tively. When studying transitions into democracy, we include as control
countries those that remain autocracies throughout the sample period, while
the treated countries are those that experience at least one transition from
autocracy to democracy. We call this sample the “democratic transitions”
sample. When studying transitions into autocracy, the control countries re-
main democracies throughout, while the treated countries have at least one
transition from democracy to autocracy. This is called the “autocratic tran-
sitions” sample.
In selecting these two samples, we had to deal with a number of compli-
cations. A few countries experience transitions close to the beginning or the
end of the period for which growth data are available. Since we expect it
to take some time for transitions to inﬂuence growth, we discard the transi-
tions that take place in the last three years of the available sample. We also
discard reforms in the ﬁrst three years of the panel to avoid a poor estimate
of growth before the transition. Speciﬁcally, we set to missing the observa-
tions of growth after (or before) a transition, if the transition is not followed
(or preceded) by at least three years of growth data. The country is then
considered a control, as if the transition did not occur.
In a few countries, especially in Africa and Latin America, we observe
transitions that only last for a few years. We discard those lasting (strictly)
less than four years, to avoid hinging the estimation on very short growth
episodes. As in the beginning or end of sample transitions, we set growth to
missing during the years of these short transitions, and classify the country
as if the transition did not occur.
In another few countries, we observe more than one long spell of democ-
racy or autocracy. Chile, for instance, starts out as a democracy in 1960,
it becomes an autocracy (the Pinochet regime) in 1973, and it returns to
democracy in 1989. This means that Chile is a treated country both when
treatment is deﬁned as transition to democracy, and when treatment is de-
ﬁned as transition to autocracy. Therefore, Chile is included as treated in the
democratic transitions sample for the years from 1973 (when it ﬁrst becomes
an autocracy) until the end of the sample. It is also included as treated in au-
tocratic transitions sample from 1960 until 1988 (the last year of autocracy).
We apply similar sample selection rules to other countries that experience
more than one spell in the same regime lasting more than three years.
When transitions are deﬁned in this way, most countries have no more
13than a single transition in one or both directions. Guatemala, Uganda and
Nigeria, however, have two transitions in the same direction. We deal with
the transitions in these three countries in two diﬀerent ways: they are either
excluded because the propensity score is outside of the common support range
(see below), or included with the transitions in the same direction assumed
independent (as if each transition applied to a diﬀerent treated country).
4 Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence Estimates
To provide a benchmark, Table 1 presents results from traditional diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerence estimation with yearly data. These results correspond to esti-
mates of equation (1) in various samples. Besides country and year ﬁxed
eﬀects, the covariates xi,t, include per-capita income lagged once, year ﬁxed
eﬀects interacted with indicators for Latin America and for Africa, indicators
for war years and lagged war years, and an indicator for formerly socialist
countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Asian provinces of the
former Soviet Union after 1989. This speciﬁcation is similar to those in the
existing literature (e.g., Giavazzi and Tabellini 2005, or Persson and Tabellini
2006).
Column 1 imposes the assumption that the eﬀect on growth of a transi-
tion into democracy is the same as the negative of the eﬀect on growth of
as transition into autocracy. The eﬀect of democracy is thus estimated in
the full sample. As in the earlier papers above, we ﬁnd that the eﬀect of de-
mocratic transitions is positive, inducing a growth acceleration of about 0.5
percentage points. Although not statistically signiﬁcant, the point estimate
is not a trivial eﬀect from an economic point of view. The long-run eﬀect is
dampened by the relatively high estimated convergence rate, however. With
a convergence rate of 5.5 percent per year, a growth acceleration of about
0.5 percentage points implies a long-run positive eﬀect of democracy on the
14level of per capita income of almost 10 percent.8
The remainder of Table 1 does not impose the symmetry constraint, but
estimates the eﬀect of democracy separately from transitions to democracy
(columns 2 and 3) and transitions to autocracy (columns 4 and 5), allowing
these two eﬀects to diﬀer. Note that when estimating the eﬀect of auto-
cratic transitions in columns 4 and 5, we still display the eﬀect of being a
democracy, computed as the negative growth eﬀect of transitions away from
democracy. In column 2, we let the sample include only the countries that be-
came democracies plus the countries that remained autocracies throughout.9
In column 3, we add to the sample those countries that remained democratic
throughout. Analogously, the sample behind column 4 includes the coun-
tries that became autocracies and the more restricted set of countries that
remained democratic throughout, while the sample behind column 5 includes
both permanent democracies and autocracies. All the estimates in Table 1
convey a similar message: democracy induces a positive, but small and gen-
erally insigniﬁcant, growth acceleration. The positive eﬀect of transitions
to democracy appears larger in absolute value (and in one case statistically
signiﬁcant) than the negative eﬀect of transitions to autocracy.
5 Matching preliminaries
We now turn to the main contribution of the paper, namely the matching ap-
proach to estimating the growth eﬀects of democracy. Before getting to the
actual estimates, however, we need to go through a number of preliminary
8The coeﬃcient φ on the democracy indicator D measures the impact eﬀect on growth
yt − yt−1. Because lagged (log) income yt−1 enter on the RHS of the estimated equation







With estimates ￿ φ = 0.5 and ￿ β = −0.055, we obtain a long-run income gain of 0.09. i.e.,
about 9 percent. Since the convergence rate β is likely overestimated in yearly data (due
to cyclical ﬂuctuations in income), this is almost surely an underestimate of the long-run
income gain.
9This is, of course, the "democratic transition" sample defned in Section 3. In this
section, we avoid the term control countries, however, since in a diﬀerence in diﬀerence
estimation with diﬀerent treatment dates, all countries that do not have a reform in period
t eﬀectively serve as controls for those countrie that do have a reform in t.
15steps including some diagnostics. This section is devoted to these prelimi-
naries.
5.1 Estimating the propensity score
As explained in Section 2, the ﬁrst step to implement a matching cum
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator is to estimate the propensity score, the
probability of treatment, in a cross section of countries (i.e., ignoring the
time dimension). We do this separately for the events of becoming a democ-
racy and becoming an autocracy, because we want to allow the eﬀect of the
covariates on the probability of transition to be diﬀerent for the two events.
In the democratic transitions sample, the dependent variable is thus zero
for the countries that remained autocracies, and one for the countries that
experienced at least one transition towards democracy. In the autocratic
transitions sample, the dependent variable is zero for the countries that re-
mained democracies throughout, and one for the countries that experienced
at least one transition towards autocracy. Thus, the samples are partly over-
lapping (because some countries like Chile appear in both samples).
We estimate the propensity score with a logit regression. The selection
of the covariates to enter this regression is a crucial decision, that trades
oﬀ two opposite concerns. On the one hand, the selection on observables
assumption would suggest to include many covariates to ensure that the
propensity score is indeed a balancing function. On the other hand, we don’t
want to predict treatment too well, so as not to violate the common-support
assumption. Here is an instance, where the macroeconomic setting bites.
Most microeconomic application concentrate on the ﬁrst concern, because
the sample is large enough that even rare events — like an actual transition for
an observation with a low propensity score — would still occur in large enough
numbers to allowmeaningful comparisons (and small standard errors). But in
our context we also have to worry about not excluding too many countries
whose state is predicted too well. Thus, we include a limited number of
variables that are likely to inﬂuence both the occurrence of regime transitions
and its economic eﬀects, and we check the robustness of the results to two
alternative speciﬁcations. The set of covariates is the same in the democratic
and autocratic transitions samples.
To capture diﬀerences in economic development, we include real per
capita income at the beginning of the sample. As explained above, diﬀerent
countries enter our samples at diﬀerent dates, depending on political history
16or data availability. To increase comparability, we measure each country’s
per capita income in the ﬁrst year it enters a given sample relative to US
per capita income in the same year. We call the resulting variable income
relative to the US.
The countries in these samples have very diﬀerent political histories.
Some of them have a long history with entry into democracy in the distant
past, or a prolonged autocratic spell. Others became independent some time
during the sample period or few years before. To mitigate this important
source of heterogeneity, we condition on what Persson and Tabellini (2006b)
call domestic democratic capital, which measures the incidence of democracy
in each country since 1800 (or since the year of independence, if later). This
variable is assumed to accumulate in years of democracy, but to depreciate
under autocracy. The depreciation rate is estimated by Persson and Tabellini
(2006b) to ﬁt the hazard rates in a time series regression where the depen-
dent variable is exit from democracy and from autocracy. This variable is
re-scaled to lie between 0 and 1, where a 1 corresponds to the steady state
value of a country never exiting from democracy. In this paper, we mea-
sure domestic democratic capital in the ﬁrst year when a country enters the
sample.
Transitions to democracy or autocracy often occur in waves that include
several neighboring countries. To capture this phenomenon, we include a
variable measuring the geography of democracy around 1993 (the ﬁrst year in
our sample, when we have data for all formerly socialist countries in Central
and Eastern Europe). This variable, called foreign democratic capital, is a
slight variation on a similar measure used in Persson and Tabellini (2006b).
For each country, it is deﬁned as the incidence of democracy in 1993 among
all other countries within a 1750 km radius (the radius refers to the distance
between the capitals). By the deﬁnition of a share, this variable too lies
between 0 and 1, where a 1 captures the case where all countries in the
neighborhood are democratic.
Since the sample period varies in length across countries, and since the
probability of a regime transition is higher the longer is the duration of the
relevant time period, we also control for the length of the period during which
we have available data for each country, a variable called length of sample.
This variable is introduced to eliminate the possibility that sample length
covaries systematically with growth performance.
Wars are often destabilizing for political regimes and, of course, they also
hurt economic activity. Thus, we include as a covariate the fraction of war
17years (including both inter-state and civil wars) over the total period length
for which growth data are available, a variable called war years.
Finally, regime transitions are more likely for countries that start out with
a value of our democracy index, polity2, closer to the threshold of zero. At the
same time, a high initial value of polity2 might have an independent eﬀect on
the economic consequences of regime changes (for instance because a regime
change might correspond to a more gradual transition). For this reason, we
also consider including the value of polity2 in the ﬁrst year a country enters
the sample. As we shall see, however, the inclusion of this variable increases
a great deal the predictive power of the logit regressions in the sample of
autocratic transitions. This, in turn, leads to a much smaller set of treated
countries that safely meet the common support condition. Hence, we discuss
results with and without the initial value of polity 2.
The results of the logit regressions are displayed in Table 2. Columns
1 and 2 refer to the democratic transitions sample, with and without the
inclusion of the initial value of polity2. Domestic democratic capital consid-
erably raises the probability of a transition towards democracy, as expected.
Foreign democratic capital has a similar positive eﬀect, but this eﬀect is not
statistically signiﬁcant. The frequency of wars discourages democratic tran-
sitions, an eﬀect that is statistically signiﬁcant. Income relative to the US
has no eﬀect. Finally, the inclusion of the initial value of polity2 makes no
diﬀerence. Overall the pseudo R2 (the improvement in the likelihood associ-
ated with the inclusion of the covariates in addition to a constant) is 0.17,
suggesting that these covariates leave a lot of residual variation unexplained.
Columns 3 and 4 refer to the autocratic transitions sample, with and
without the initial value polity2. Here income relative to the US has strong
predictive power, with richer countries less likely to relapse into autocracy,
as expected.10 Foreign democratic capital also helps to predict transitions to
autocracy, although here the sign is opposite of what one would expect. As
anticipated, the inclusion of the initial value of polity2 makes a big diﬀer-
ence: the variable is highly signiﬁcant and with the expected sign, and when
it is included the Pseudo R2 jumps from 0.43 to 0.61. Overall, these covari-
ates help to predict transitions from democracy to autocracy much better
than transitions in the opposite direction. As already discussed, this is a
10The results on income are consistent with the results in the annual hazard rates esti-
mated by Persson and Tabellini (2006b), who ﬁnd that income does not explain transitions
out of autocracy, but does slow down transitions out of democracy.
18mixed blessing, since it makes the selection on observables assumption more
credible, but at the same time strains the credibility of the common support
assumption.
Figure 1 depicts the density of the estimated propensity score fromcolumns
1 and 3 respectively of Table 2 (i.e., the speciﬁcation that does not include
the initial value of polity2), for both treated and control countries. Ob-
servations outside of the common support we impose are dropped and not
displayed in Figure 1 (see the discussion in the next subsection). As one
would expect from the estimation results, the distribution of the propensity
scores for the treated and the controls are more similar in the sample of
democratic transitions, where treatment is predicted less well, than in the
sample of autocratic transitions. Both samples display considerable overlap
between treated and control countries, however. Overall, the ﬁgure suggests
that matching should work well, at least if the local comparisons are made
within relatively broad regions of the propensity score (a coarse balancing
function), so as to guarantee overlap .
5.2 Countries inside the common support
The ﬁrst column of Tables 3a and 3b report the full list of countries in each
of the two samples. These are sorted in ascending order of the estimated
propensity scores, which are displayed in the third column. To facilitate
reading the table, the name of treated countries are indicated by boldface
font, whereas the name of control countries are not. The same information is
given in column 2: the variable treated in the second column equals 0 for the
countries in the control group and 1 for the countries in the treated group.
The last two columns of each table report the change in polity2 in the year
of the regime transition, and the year of that (those) transition(s).
It is important to verify that the common-support assumption is not ob-
viously violated, and possibly to drop observations for which the estimated
propensity score is too close to its bounds of 0 and 1. Consider the demo-
cratic transitions sample in Table 3a. At the lower bound (the top of the
table), we are comfortably away from 0. The ﬁrst observation, Yemen, is a
control with an estimated propensity score of 0.17. The third observation,
Iran is the ﬁrst treated country (according to our generous deﬁnition, Iran
became a democracy in 1997), with an estimated propensity score of 0.28.
At the upper end (the bottom of the table), instead, several treated countries
are predicted very well to switch into democracy. There is no ﬁrm rule for
19how to deal with this situation. We choose to drop all treated observations
with a propensity score above 0.9. This has the advantage of not drawing
inferences from Guatemala (the unique country to experience two long spells
of democracy), and gives a fair margin away from unity. Adopting a higher
upper bound and including more countries would not aﬀect the estimates.
But the results are sensitive to a more conservative, lower upper bound, es-
sentially because Haiti (with an estimated propensity score of 0.887) is a
large outlying observation which makes some diﬀerence. We comment more
on this below.
Next, consider the autocratic transitions sample in Table 3b, where we
face the opposite problem. The controls (that remained democracies through-
out) are predicted very well around 0 and there is little overlap with treated
countries, while at the upper end the lack of overlap is less serious. Here,
we choose to drop all observations with an estimated propensity score be-
low 0.075 and above 0.93. At the upper end the choice is made so that the
Nigeria and Uganda (the only two treated countries with multiple spells of
autocracy) are dropped from the sample. But adopting a higher or lower
threshold would not change the results. At the lower end, one outlying ob-
servation matters quite a bit for the results: Belarus, which starts out as
a (weak) democracy, and drops into dictatorship after a few years. Since
the time period where we have data for Belarus is very short, and since the
next treated country is Greece with a much higher propensity score (0.19 vs.
0.07 for Belarus), we choose to be conservative and exclude Belarus from the
common support. At the low end, we thus start the sample with Austria, a
control with a propensity score slightly above 0.075. Adopting an even more
conservative, higher bound for the common support does not aﬀect the ﬁnal
results.
5.3 The balancing property
To what extent is the propensity score a balancing function, i.e., how well
does our matching on the propensity score balance the distribution of relevant
covariates across treated and control countries? The answer to this question
is important, because this is where the value added of this methodology lies.
Tables 4a and 4b provide the answer for our two samples of democratic and
autocratic transitions.
Each double row in the table refers to a speciﬁc covariate. We consider
all covariates included in the logit regressions of Table 2 (including the ini-
20tial value of polity2), plus three dummy variables for continental location
(in Latin America, or Asia, or Africa). The upper single row (labeled un-
matched) for each variable displays the simple average of that variable in
the treated groups and control group, respectively, plus the tstatistic and
the p-value for the null hypothesis that these averages are the same in the
treated and control group. This ﬁrst set of statistics is calculated over the
full set of countries listed in Tables 3a and 3b, respectively, before imposing
the common support assumption. Clearly, the null of equal means is rejected
for many variables in either or both of the tables. Thus, treated and control
countries diﬀer systematically with regard to economic development (relative
income), political history (domestic democratic capital), and -political geog-
raphy (foreign democratic capital). Initial democracy as measured by polity2
is also very diﬀerent in the treated and control groups in the "autocratic
transitions" sample. Finally, the treated and control groups also seem to be
drawn from diﬀerent continents (in particular with regard to Latin America
and Africa).
The lower single row for each variable (labeled matched) present a simi-
lar set of statistics calculated in a diﬀerent way. First, we impose the com-
mon support assumption for both the treated and the control countries, as
discussed above. We then calculated the means for the treated countries.
Clearly, this changes their means for the treated group. Second, we display
the matched means for the control countries, namely a weighted average
where each control country receives a weight based on the propensity score,
corresponding to the matching procedure described in the next subsection
(see also equations (7) and (8) above).
Clearly, matching equalizes the means of all covariates used in the logit
regression. Interestingly, it also reduces the diﬀerence in means of some of
the other covariates, Africa and Latin America in Table 4b, Latin America
in Table 4a. This gives some credence to our earlier expectation that ob-
served (included among the covariates) and unobserved (not included among
the covariates) country characteristics may be correlated. In the autocratic
transitions sample, however, the variable initial value of polity2 retains a very
diﬀerent distribution in the treated and control groups, which suggests the
importance of also conditioning on the initial value of polity2 in this sample.
Overall, and with the caveat just mentioned on initial value of polity2,
matching seems indispensable to achieve a balanced distribution of covariates
between treated and control countries — the so-called balancing property.
Without matching based on the propensity scores, the two samples are quite
21diﬀerent. This means that the assumption of linearity can not be treated as
an innocuous linear approximation. Various interaction eﬀects may thus bias
the inference drawn from traditional diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence regressions.
6 Matching Estimates
With the preliminaries of the previous section in hand, we are ready to
estimate the eﬀect of political transitions on the treated countries. This
section is devoted to the estimation results.
6.1 Democratic transitions
We start with transitions towards democracy. To get a benchmark, we start
by reporting linear regression estimates obtained with a two-step procedure
suggested in a recent paper by Bertrand et al. (2004). The purpose of
that procedure is not to address heterogeneity giving bias in the coeﬃcients,
but serial correlation yielding (upward) bias in the standard errors. The
procedure treats the data in a similar way, however, in its averaging the
outcome of interest before and after the treatment. Because they impose
the parametric assumptions of a linear regression, these estimates provide
a useful perspective on the ﬁnal results from the non-parametric matching
procedure..
Speciﬁcally, the Bertrand et al estimates are obtained as follows. In a
ﬁrst step, growth is regressed against country and year ﬁxed eﬀects in a
sample with yearly data from all countries, treated and controls. Then, the
estimated residuals of the treated countries only are retained and averaged
before and after each country’s transition date. This yields a panel of two
periods with only treated countries. Finally, the averaged residuals in this
panel are regressed against a constant and a dummy variable, which is equal
to 1 in the second period (after the transition) and 0 in the ﬁrst (before the
transition). The estimated coeﬃcient and standard errors thus correspond
to the diﬀerence in diﬀerence estimator of the average eﬀect of transition in
the treated countries. As explained by Bertrand et al. (2004), this procedure
removes the serial correlation in the yearly residuals — a potential problem
in the yearly regressions of Table 1.
Column 1 of Table 5 implements this procedure for all countries in the
democratic transitions sample, where the control countries are those that re-
22mained autocracies throughout and the treated are those that made a tran-
sition to democracies. The estimated coeﬃcient, although not statistically
signiﬁcant, implies an average growth acceleration of 0.6 percentage points
after transitions to democracy. Despite the diﬀerent procedure and speciﬁca-
tion, this estimate is remarkably similar to that reported in Table 1, column 2
(contrary to Table 1, the ﬁrst step does not include initial income, indicators
for wars, socialist transitions, and continents interacted with years). In the
democratic transitions sample, the average date of reform is in the late 1980s,
with about twelve years of post-transition growth. This implies an average
eﬀect on per capita income at the end of the sample of about 7-8 percent.
This estimate is consistent with the long-run eﬀects on income implied by
Table 1. In column 2 of Table 5, we drop control and treated countries out-
side of the common support deﬁned in the Section 5 (cf. Table 3a). The
point estimate increases a bit, but remains statistically insigniﬁcant.
Columns 3 to 6 of Table 5 present the matching estimates. In columns
3 and 4, the underlying speciﬁcation of the propensity score does not con-
dition on the initial value of polity2, while in columns 5 and 6 it does. All
estimators are based on Kernel matching, i.e., the weight on speciﬁc controls
are declining in their distance in propensity score to the treated country
they are matched with. Columns 3 and 5 weigh control countries with the
Epanechnikov measure, which gives zero weight to all controls whose es-
timated propensity score diﬀers by more than 0.25 to that of the treated
country. Columns 4 and 6 use a Gaussian kernel, which gives all control
countries weights that approach zero for the more distant controls — see Leu-
ven and Sianesi (2003) for more detailed information. Note that each country
in the control group is used several times in the matching, particularly when
we use the Gaussian kernel. As explained in Section 2, we compute two
sets of standard errors: the lowermost parenthesis below each point estimate
corresponds to an upper bound.
All our estimates form a consistent picture despite the diﬀerent covariates
and matching procedures. The point estimate of the eﬀect of democratic
transitions ranges between 0.83 and 1.08, an economically relevant eﬀect that
is considerably higher than the linear estimates. Recalling that the eﬀect
refers to average growth during an average post-transition period, which
lasts about twelve years, a growth acceleration of 1 percent implies that
per capita income is 13 percent higher at the end of the sample. Despite
the magnitude of the point estimate, the standard errors are large enough
that the eﬀect remains statistically insigniﬁcant. This is not unexpected,
23given that matching estimators are not likely to be very precise in such a
small sample. To say it diﬀerently: we are trading oﬀ unbiasedness against
eﬃciency.
An important property of the matching estimation procedure is that it
directs our attention to heterogenous eﬀects of democratic transitions in dif-
ferent countries, pointing to inﬂuential observations and to other relevant
features of the data. Figures 2 and 3 explore these issues.
Figure 2 displays histograms of the distribution of the variables gi (in the
left panel) and g
j
i (in the right panel), deﬁned in Section 2. Intuitively, Fig-
ure 2 shows the change in average growth after democratic transitions in the
groups of treated countries (the left panel), and control countries (the right
panel) at comparable dates. The treated countries have observations sym-
metrically distributed around 0, except for a large positive outlier, namely
Haiti where democracy was associated with a growth acceleration of about 19
percent. There are some outliers in the group of control countries as well, but
these are less inﬂuential because the control group is much larger than the
treated group. More importantly, the distribution of the change in growth in
the control countries is clearly tilted to the left and has its mass below zero.
Thus, the positive point estimate in Table 5 is not due to an improvement
in growth in the countries that became democratic (with the exception of
Haiti), but rather due to a deterioration of growth in the control countries
that remained autocracies. In other words, under a causal interpretation, by
becoming democracies the treated countries avoided the growth slump that
hit the permanent autocracies in the control group.
Figure 3 displays the contribution to the average growth eﬀect of treated
countries by their propensity scores. Speciﬁcally, the vertical axis plots the
estimator ˆ αi deﬁned above, namely the estimated eﬀect in treated country i,
while the horizontal axis reports the estimated propensity score in country
i expressed as the average change in growth rate (in percentage points per
year) .11 This ﬁgure reveals that there is no systematic relationship between
the individual treatment eﬀect and the estimated probability of treatment.
This is reassuring, because selection into treatment is not systematically
correlated with performance, in accordance with the identifying assumption.
The ﬁgure also shows that the growth eﬀects of democratic transitions are
very heterogeneous across countries, with impact eﬀects ranging from −5
to +5 percentage points. Together with the unbalanced distribution of
11The growth estimates refer to column 3 in Table 5.
24covariates across treated and control countries (cf. Table 4a and 4b), this
suggests that the linear estimates are quite fragile. As already noted, Haiti
remains an inﬂuential outlier even after matching (dropping Haiti from the
sample would reduce the estimated growth eﬀect almost by a half). Finally,
note that much of the heterogeneity in the eﬀect of treatment derives from
less developed countries with rather fragile democratic institutions, such as
Uganda, Guyana, Congo, Romania. This is not unexpected, because growth
is likely to be more volatile in such countries, and autocracies are likely
to be associated with highly corrupt and bad dictatorships. It is reassuring,
however, that we ﬁnd no systematic relationship between these heterogeneous
eﬀects and some of the observed covariates, such as per-capita income or
the intensity of the treatment (as measured by the change in the polity2
score associated with democratic transitions). This can be guessed already
by a cursory look at the symmetric distribution of countries in Figure 3,
and is conﬁrmed by a more careful analysis where we regress the individual
treatment eﬀect against the observed covariates.
6.2 Autocratic transitions
Finally, we turn to the autocratic transitions sample with countries treated
with a transition to autocracy and a control group of democracies which
are politically stable during the sample period. The estimates are displayed
in Table 6, with columns exactly analogous to those of Table 5. Here, the
estimates captures the eﬀect of transition to autocracy, and thus we expect
them to have a negative sign.
Consider the two-step linear estimates in columns 1 and 2. In this case,
it makes a big diﬀerence whether or not we impose the common support.
When all observations are included (column 1), the eﬀect of a relapse into
autocracy is essentially zero (a point estimate of 0.17, with a large standard
error). Dropping all observations outside of the common support (column
2), however, turns the estimate negative and almost statistically signiﬁcant:
according to the point estimate, a transition to autocracy cuts average yearly
growth by 0.84 percent. As shown in Table 3b, the observations outside the
common support are made up by a large group of very solid democracies, un-
likely treated Belarus, and a few African countries at the opposite extreme of
the propensity score. Belarus in particular is a very inﬂuential observation,
because its growth rate accelerates dramatically towards the end of the sam-
ple when it also turns to autocracy. These countries are indeed very diﬀerent
25from most of the other countries in the sample. Thus the estimates in column
2, which restrict attention to countries on the common support, may be the
most reliable.
The remaining columns of Table 6 report the matching estimates, which
all deliver a similar and robust message. A transition into autocracy cuts
average yearly growth by a statistically signiﬁcant and large amount, which
ranges from −1.6 to −2.4 percentage points. The average year of autocratic
transition is about 1975. This makes the level eﬀects at the end of the
sample very large: a reduction in the post-transition growth rate of, say,
−1.8 percentage points sustained for 25 years corresponds to a 45 percent
loss of per capita income.
The estimated treatment eﬀect is not particularly sensitive to including
the initial value of polity2 among the covariates in the underlying propensity
score. This is reassuring, in light of the unbalanced distribution of this vari-
able across the treated and control groups (cf. Table 4b). However, when
the initial value of polity2 enters the estimated propensity score, the number
of countries on the common support shrinks further, because treatment is
predicted quite well.12 As a result, the estimates become more sensitive to
the weighting procedure (cf. columns 5 and 6).
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the contribution of individual countries to these
estimates, in the same way as Figures 2 and 3. Figure 4 contrasts with
the democratic transition case in Figure 2, in that the treated group has a
distribution with mass below a zero change in growth, while the distribution
for the group of control counties seems centered at, or slightly above, zero.
Thus, the estimated negative growth eﬀect of autocracy is mainly due to
a growth deccelaration in countries that relapsed into autocracy. Once we
impose the common support, there appears to be no inﬂuential outliers in
the group of treated countries.
Figure 5 plots the estimates of the individual treatment eﬀects against
the estimated propensity scores.13 As in Figure 3, there is considerable het-
erogeneity. But we detect no systematic relation to the estimated propensity
score (nor against other covariates). Moreover, no single treated country
12When we condition also on the initial value of polity2 we change the range corre-
sponding to the common support to those treated and control countries with an estimated
common support in the range (0.11-0.98). In Table 5, the deﬁnition of the common sup-
port remains instead the same irrespective of whether we condition or not the initial value
of polity2.
13The estimates refer to column 3 in Table 6.
26appears particularly inﬂuential. Instead, most countries have a large and
negative eﬀect of treatment, suggesting that the large negative estimate of
the average eﬀect in Table 6 is quite robust.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have estimated the eﬀect of political regime transitions on growth in a
new way, paying close attention to heterogenous eﬀects. Our non-parametric
matching estimates suggest that previous parametric estimates may have se-
riously underestimated the growth eﬀects of democracy. In particular, we
ﬁnd an average negative eﬀect on per capita income of leaving democracy as
large as 45 percent over the sample. We also ﬁnd clear indications that the
discrepancies relative to the parametric results are driven by large diﬀerences
in the composition of the treatment and control groups, making linearity a
doubtful assumption. While our matching estimates do allow for hetero-
geneity in a very general way, it is important to recall that they rest on the
speciﬁc assumption of selection on observables.
As far as we know, our paper is the ﬁrst to combine matching and dif-
ference in diﬀerences in a macroeconomic context. This seems a promising
avenue for further work on the eﬀects of reform. In the context of political
reforms and growth, it would be natural to investigate the eﬀects of diﬀerent
types of democracy (or diﬀerent types of autocracy, as do Besley and Ku-
damatsu, 2007). But similar estimation techniques could be used to empiri-
cally analyze also other types of reform, where we might suspect the eﬀects
to be quite heterogenous. Reforms introducing central bank independence
and/or inﬂation targeting may be a particular case in point.
8 Appendix
Here we compute the standard error of the estimator ˆ α given in (8) — see also
















Suppose that all treated countries have the same variance σ2
T = V ar(gi|
i is treated), and that all control countries also have the same variance,
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This is our lower bound for the estimated variance of α.








i are mutually uncorrelated for j  = l (i.e. observations corresponding
to diﬀerent control countries are mutually uncorrelated, while observations
drawn from the same control are perfectly correlated when that control is
used several times for diﬀerent treated countries). Then:












This is our upper bound for the estimated variance of ˆ α.
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  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  Growth 
           
Democracy  0.48  0.58  0.73  0.26  0.35 
  (0.34)  (0.54)  (0.42)*  (0.65)  (0.63) 
           
Lagged income  - 5.45  - 6.20  - 5.38  - 5.04  - 6.06 
        (0.62)***       (0.81)***      (0.65)***       (0.97)***      (0.93)*** 
           











Control group  Permanent  










autocracy or  
democracy 
           
Observations  4323  2554  4000  1985  2924 
N. countries  138  76  123  70  97 
Adj. R-sq.  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.13  0.08 
 
Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Other Covariates: country and year fixed effects; year fixed effects interacted with indicators for Latin America and for Africa, indicators for war years and 
lagged war years, and an indicator for formerly socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Asian provinces of the former Soviet Union after 
1989.   
                                                         Table 2   Estimates of the propensity score 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Democratic transition   Autocratic transition 
         
Length of sample  2.40  2.52  2.63  4.08 
  (1.97)  (1.95)  (1.50)*  (2.20)* 
         
Income relative to the US  - 0.002  - 0.003  - 0.03  - 0.02 
  (0.005)  (0.005)      (0.01)***      (0.01)** 
         
War years  - 8.35  -8.14  - 3.69  - 10.33 
    (4.71)*  (4.84)*  (5.58)  (7.13) 
         
Domestic democratic capital  8.73  8.82  0.65  -0.35 
     (4.25)**    (4.20)**  (2.29)  (2.05) 
         
Foreign democratic capital   1.73  1.90  3.26  2.42 
  (1.21)  (1.24)     (1.26)***  (1.31)* 
         
Initial value of polity2    0.04    -0.89 
    (0.06)        (0.22)*** 
         
Observations  77  77  70  70 
Pseudo R-sq  0.17  0.17  0.43  0.61 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Relative income, domestic democratic capital, initial value of polity2  are measured in first year of sample, foreign democratic capital is measured in 1993. 
      
                     Table 3a   Transitions from autocracy to democracy  
 
 




Date of  
reform 
         
Yemen  0  .1712141  .   
Angola  0  .1947455  .   
Iran  1  .2785125  9  1997 
Chad  0  .3203447  .   
Mozambique  1  .3398073  12  1994 
Comoros  1  .354881  11  1990 
Vietnam  0  .3581062  .   
Uganda  1  .3897252  10  1980 
El Salvador  1  .4127302  2  1982 
Sierra Leone  0  .4226772  .   
Equatorial Guin.  0  .424049  .   
Guinea-Bissau  1  .4358898  11  1994 
Zaire  0  .4407421  .   
Tanzania  0  .4520402  .  2000 
Morocco  0  .4527073  .   
Central African Republic  1  .4552693  12  1993 
Rwanda  0  .4708738  .   
Mauritania  0  .4757592  .   
Algeria  0  .4805619  .   
Guinea  0  .4810042  .   
Nicaragua  1  .4910639  7  1990 
Burundi  0  .4922749  .   
Thailand  1  .5017168  4  1978 
Syria  0  .5023594  .   
Niger  1  .5082768  8  1991 
Bangladesh  1  .5125053  11  1991 
Senegal  0  .5249349  .  2000 
Gabon  0  .537788  .   
Ivory Coast  0  .5521293  .  2000 
Togo  0  .5554183  .   
Benin  1  .555422  6  1991 
Congo  1  .5571044  6  1992 
Mali  1  .5590481  7  1992 
Cameroon  0  .5675696  .   
Ghana  1  .5689386  3  1996 
Jordan  0  .5769697  .   
Nigeria  1  .5864162  7  1979 
Madagascar  1  .594099  8  1991 
Burkina Faso  0  .5977144  .  1977 




Date of  
Reform 
Hungary  1  .6095265  6  1989 
Taiwan  1  .611932  8  1992 
Malawi  1  .6158609  15  1994 
Cyprus  1  .638754  7  1968 
Zambia  1  .653224  15  1991 
Singapore  0  .6654041  .   
Indonesia  0  .6893978  .  1999 
Portugal  1  .69704  6  1975 
Lesotho  1  .7038091  15  1993 
Nepal  1  .7060294  7  1990 
Dominican Republic  1  .7089661  9  1978 
China  0  .7145793  .   
Tunisia  0  .7278883  .   
Romania  1  .7553898  7  1990 
Mexico  1  .7785828  4  1994 
Philippines  1  .7795237  7  1986 
South Korea  1  .799453  6  1987 
Pakistan  1  .8041176  12  1988 
Paraguay  1  .8284625  10  1989 
Egypt  0  .8383721  .   
Cuba  0  .8655669  .   
Ethiopia  1  .8730649  1  1993 
Haiti  1  .8866652  14  1994 
Panama  1  .8921999  16  1989 
Guyana  1  .8947882  13  1992 
         
Outside Common Support 
         
Guatemala  1  .9190304  8  1966 
Guatemala  1  .9190304  4  1986 
Ecuador  1  .9237149  14  1979 
Honduras  1  .9413305  2  1980 
Brazil  1  .9437772  10  1985 
Spain  1  .9685184  4  1976 
Argentina  1  .979982  16  1983 
Uruguay  1  .9839289  16  1985 
Bolivia  1  .9866512  15  1982 
Peru  1  .9885088  5  1979 
Greece  1  .9948298  8  1974 
Chile  1  .9977797  9  1989 
 
 Note: The propensity score is estimated as in column 1 of Table 2  
                   Table 3b   Transitions from democracy to autocracy  
 
 




Date of  
reform 
         
Outside Common Support 
         
New Zealand  0  .0014931  .   
Australia  0  .0016789  .   
Iceland  0  .0040472  .   
South Africa  0  .0105352  .   
Switzerland  0  .0115997  .   
Czech Republic  0  .0148975  .   
Slovenia  0  .0238694  .   
United States  0  .0261698  .   
Luxembourg  0  .0281385  .   
Israel  0  .0299115  .   
Denmark  0  .0345439  .   
Germany  0  .0352485  .   
Sweden  0  .0398666  .   
Papua New Guinea  0  .0476861  .   
France  0  .04837  .   
United Kingdom  0  .0497661  .   
Netherlands  0  .0540976  .   
Fiji  0  .0557607  .  1987 
Canada  0  .0612058  .   
Venezuela  0  .0615961  .   
Slovak Republic  0  .063058  .   
Latvia  0  .063171  .   
Ukraine  0  .0654528  .   
Italy  0  .0667572  .   
Belarus  1  .0720809  -7  1995 
Russia  0  .0729471  .   
         
Inside Common Support 
         
Austria  0  .0757894  .   
Finland  0  .0819311  .   
Norway  0  .0822244  .   
Belgium  0  .0840312  .   
Japan  0  .0974352  .   
Bulgaria  0  .0998625  .   
Estonia  0  .1184082  .   
Namibia  0  .1368068  .   




Date of  
Reform 
         
Greece  1  .1918558  -11  1967 
Macedonia  0  .2195661  .   
Uruguay  1  .2241872  -6  1972 
Ireland  0  .2807057  .   
Sri Lanka  0  .2912095  .   
Malaysia  0  .3415968  .   
Zimbabwe  1  .4292819  -7  1987 
Turkey  0  .4345146  .  1980 
Armenia  1  .4382235  -9  1996 
Peru  1  .5047568  -12  1968 
Chile  1  .5215374  -13  1973 
Costa Rica  0  .52407  .   
Mauritius  0  .541923  .   
Jamaica  0  .553453  .   
Colombia  0  .5750838  .   
Guatemala  1  .6118631  -4  1974 
Sierra Leone  1  .6188506  -7  1971 
Panama  1  .6420545  -11  1968 
Zambia  1  .6628014  -2  1968 
Philippines  1  .6917624  -11  1972 
Congo  1  .7105513  -11  1997 
South Korea  1  .717416  -12  1972 
Albania  0  .7235891  .  1996 
Gambia  1  .729219  -15  1994 
Brazil  1  .7480876  -6  1964 
India  0  .8504922  .   
Kenya  1  .8767781  -2  1966 
Guyana  1  .878488  -1  1978 
Botswana  0  .9226773  .   
Pakistan  1  .9228303  -15  1977 
         
Outside Common Support 
         
Nigeria  1  .9312006  -14  1966 
Nigeria  1  .9312006  -14  1984 
Lesotho  1  .9540992  -18  1970 
Uganda  1  .9912787  -7  1966 
Uganda  1  .9912787  -3  1985 
 
Note: The propensity score is estimated as in column 3 of Table 2  
       Table 4a   Treated vs Controls:  countries that became democracies 
 
 
Note: polity2, relative income, democratic capital are measured in first year of sample, foreign democratic capital is 
measured in 1993.   Matching is based on the estimates reported in column 1 of Table 2.  
When computing the unmatched means we do not impose the common support restriction, while we do 
when computing the matched means. 
Variable  Sample  Mean  t-test 
    Treated  Control  t  p  >  |t| 
           
Unmatched  -201.16  -228.1  1.59  0.116  Relative income 
Matched  -222.22  -220.4  -0.12  0.91 
           
Unmatched  0.12  0.02     3.01***  0.00  Domestic democratic 
capital   Matched  0.05  0.03  0.64  0.53 
           
Unmatched  0.60  0.43     2.55***  0.01  Foreign democratic 
capital  Matched  0.51  0.48  0.44  0.66 
           
Length of sample  Unmatched  0.92  0.87  1.25  0.22 
  Matched  0.90  0.90  0.01  0.99 
           
Unmatched  0.04  0.05  -0.50  0.62  War years 
Matched  0.04  0.04  -0.08  0.94 
           
Unmatched  -4.78  -5.07  0.29  0.77  Initial value of 
polity2   Matched  -5.03  -5.43  0.39  0.70 
           
Unmatched  0.37  0.04     3.45***  0.00  Latin America 
Matched  0.22  0.06  1.99*  0.05 
           
Asia  Unmatched  0.14  0.14  0.0  1.00 
  Matched  0.19  0.20  -0.08  0.93 
           
Africa  Unmatched  0.33  0.71  -3.49***  0.00 
  Matched  0.43  0.67  -2.05**  0.04  
       Table 4b   Treated vs. controls:  countries that became autocracies 
 
 
Note: Polity2, relative income, democratic capital are measured in first year of sample, foreign democratic capital is 
measured in 1993. When computing the unmatched means we do not impose the common support, when 
computing the matched means we do.  
Variable  Sample  Mean  t-test 
    Treated  Control  t  p  >  |t| 
           
Unmatched  -217.89  -95.43    - 6.50***  0.00  Relative income 
Matched  -194.20  -185.44  -0.41  0.69 
           
Unmatched  .10  .25  -2.49**  0.01  Domestic democratic 
capital   Matched  .137  .16  -0.33  0.74 
           
Unmatched  .57  .69  -1.44  0.15  Foreign democratic 
capital  Matched  .61  .71  -0.97  0.34 
           
Length of sample  Unmatched  .84  .75  1.13  0.26 
  Matched  .88  .80  0.99  0.33 
           
Unmatched  .05  .03  1.46  0.15  War years 
Matched  .04  .05  -0.09  0.93 
           
Unmatched  4.12  8.68     - 6.67***  0.00  Initial value of 
polity2   Matched  3.39  8.13     - 4.41***  0.00 
           
Unmatched  .28  .11  1.90*  0.06  Latin America 
Matched  .39  .33  0.37  0.71 
           
Asia  Unmatched  .16  .09  0.96  0.34 
  Matched  .17  .19  -0.17  0.87 
           
Africa  Unmatched  .44  .09    3.83**  0.00 
  Matched  .33  .20  0.88  0.39           Table 5    Democracy and growth:  OLS and Matching estimates of the growth effect of becoming a democracy 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Growth 
             
Growth effect of democracy   0.60  0.74  1.08  1.19  0.83  1.01 
in the group of treated countries  (0.54)  (0.68)  (0.78)  (0.77)  (0.79)  (0.77) 
      (1.24)  (1.25)  (1.25)  (1.26) 
             
             
Estimation  Diff in diff  
2 steps 
Diff in diff  
2 steps 
Matching  Matching  Matching  Matching 
Kernel      Epanechnikov  Normal  Epanechnikov  Normal 
Propensity score conditional 
on initial value of polity2 








Inside common support  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N. Treated countries  49  37  37  37  36  36 
N. Control countries      28  28  28  28 
N. Controls incl.  repetitions      651  937  639  910 
 
Note: Cols (1-2): Standard errors in parenthesis.  Cols (3)-(6): First parenthesis:  standard errors estimated assuming independent observations, second 
parenthesis: standard  errors estimated assuming perfect correlations of repeated observations in control countries. 
Cols (1-2):  Outcome variable: Averaged residual of a regression of growth on country and year fixed effects. First step of Diff in diff  2 steps: OLS of yearly 
growth on country and year fixed effects, in a sample that also includes the control countries, second step: OLS of averaged residuals in the treated countries 
only (averaged before and after treatment respectively), on dummy variable equal to 1 after treatment 
Cols (3-6): Outcome variable: change in average growth (after – before reform year).  
Common support imposed (according to Table 3a) as indicated in all columns. 
 
    Table 6    Democracy and growth:  OLS and Matching estimates of the growth effect of becoming an autocracy  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Growth 
             
Growth effect of autocracy   0.17  -0.84  - 1.97  - 1.85  - 2.38  - 1.55 
in the group of treated countries  (0.72)   (0.42)*     (0.58)***      (0.53)***     (1.31)**     (0.75)** 
         (1.00)**    (0.92)**  (3.59)  (1.57) 
             
Estimation  Diff in diff  
2 steps 
Diff in diff  
2 steps 
Matching  Matching  Matching  Matching 
Kernel      Epanechnikov  Normal  Epanechnikov  Normal 
Propensity score conditional 
on initial value of polity2 








Inside common support  No  Yes  Yes  Yes     
N. Treated countries  20  18  18  18  14  14 
N. Control countries      18  18  15  15 
N. Controls incl.  repetitions      107  289  34  176 
 
Note: Cols (1-2): Standard errors in parenthesis.  Cols (3)-(6): First parenthesis:  standard errors estimated assuming independent observations, second 
parenthesis: standard  errors estimated assuming perfect correlations of repeated observations in control countries. 
Cols (1-2):  Outcome variable: Averaged residual of a regression of growth on country and year fixed effects. First step of Diff in diff  2 steps: OLS of yearly 
growth on country and year fixed effects, in a sample that also includes the control countries, second step: OLS of averaged residuals in the treated countries only 
(averaged before and after treatment respectively), on dummy variable equal to 1 after treatment 
Cols (3-6): Outcome variable: change in average growth (after – before reform year).  
Common support imposed (according to Table 3a) as indicated in all columns, except in cols (5-6), where it is [0.11, 0.98] CESifo Working Paper Series 
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